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The aim of this paper is threefold: we first discuss the appropriateness of the traditional trust-game-
tree for the analysis of trust relationships. Following the definition put forward by Lee et al. (2005) 
that “confident expectations and a willingness to be vulnerable are critical components of all 
definitions of trust”, we relate these criteria to the subjective probabilities given by Coleman’s 
inequality. Then, we develop the “trust-tree-game” further to a psychological trust game in the vein 
of Dufwenberg (2002). Here, we complement the concept of “trust responsiveness” with the idea of 
“honouring trust responsiveness” which enables us to consider the issue of mutuality in trust 
relationships. In a second step, we move on to the concept of mutual trust (which is more than some 
degree of mutuality in a trust relationship), where each individual can be both trustor and trustee. 
This aspect is visualized within the two-person optimal intertemporal consumption choice model. 
The corresponding “creditor-debtor-game” reproduces the well known “prisoner’s dilemma”. In a 
third step we analyse in depth how the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is related to trust and 
trustworthiness in (inter)national credit contracts. The fact that we observe multiple creditor-debtor-
relationships in an economy seems to reflect not only the gains from cooperation in repeated games, 
but also the existence of “generalized” trust in the society.       
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Following Dufwenberg (who quotes Rotter) trust is an “expectancy held by an individual that 
the word, promise, oral or written statement of another individual or group can be relied on.” 
(ibid., 2002, p. 62). As Lee et al. (2005) add, “confident expectations and a willingness to be 
vulnerable are critical components of all definitions of trust” (ibid., p. 609). The vulnerability 
stems in the first place from the fact that a trustor offers some sort of goods/services to the 
trustee and can expect – if at all – an “equivalent” from the trustee only after some time delay 
(Haug 1997, p. 16). While the first component explains why a trustor is prepared to take the 
first step or action towards the trustee, the second gives a hint as to why he is willing to afford 
a, so to say, “first-mover-disadvantage”. And, what is most crucial: the trustor accepts this 
“first-mover-disadvantage” not in addition to his confidence, but because he is confident, or, 
in other words, because he expects reciprocity (Bolle 2007, p. 2). Accepting a disadvantage 
from the beginning should be taken as a rational decision, perhaps even “super-rational” 
among rational agents, and not as the outcome of some sort of “bounded rationality”. Hence, 
there is no reason to believe that confidence, which motivates this acceptance, is irrational. 
Quite the opposite is true. “Trust responsiveness” can tell us why.   
 
The concept of “trust responsiveness” has (at least) two virtues: in a way it introduces in a 
rational way “emotions” and “norms” into the sober concept of the “trust game”, more 
precisely it claims that trustworthiness-related emotions and acquired norms of the trustee 
have a significant impact on his actions. Notice that the trustor, when anticipating the 
existence of these emotions/norms among the trustee, is not irrational at all. The clue of “trust 
responsiveness” lies in the fact that it tends to reduce the implicit, so to say, “second-mover-
advantage” of the trustee. A precondition for the functioning of this mechanism is, as is well 
known (Sell/Wiens 2006) that the trustee has to recognize or likewise realize the confidence 
which the trustor invests in the action towards the trustee and in the trustee himself. But the 
trustor, then, will in many cases notice in a face-to-face situation whether and, if, how much 
“trust responsiveness” is felt by the trustee from his observable reaction, unless the trustee is a 
good actor
1, i. e. a liar. As a result, we have here an individual-specific signalling in the trust 
process yet from the beginning.  
 
When there is no face-to-face situation, there are widespread (either formal or informal) social 
norms which sanction an attitude in the case that someone does not honour trust put in him by 
somebody else: “If A does something for B and trusts B to reciprocate in the future, this 
establishes an expectation in A and an obligation on the part of B. This obligation can be 
conceived as a credit slip held by A for performance by B.” (Coleman 2000, p. 20). This is 
common knowledge for the trustor and for the trustee and it can serve as a general signal, 
provided the trustee can credibly communicate his adhesion to the common rules of credit 
transactions. Generalizing, Lorenz (1999, p. 308) calls them “procedural rules (which 
contribute, the author) … to the build-up of trust”. Both the individual-specific and the 
general signal are actions “taken by the better informed party in a setting of asymmetric 
information to communicate its true characteristics in a credible fashion to the less-informed 
party.” (Lee et al., p. 610). Both the individual-specific and the general signal have the 
objective  to signal trustworthiness (ibid., p. 621), but of course can never establish 
trustworthiness. For the trustee, gaining trustworthiness has benefits in any case: „How can 
                                                 
1 „Studies in applied psychology have shown that empathy in many spheres is strongest when the interchange is 





you cheat another person without having gained trustworthiness in his eyes before“ is a quote 
from a gangster movie. These benefits have to be weighted against the opportunity costs of 
building up the reputation of being trustworthy.  
 
What can be, on this background, the motivation for an other (to cite Yusuf Islam’s recent 
album) contribution to the trust puzzle? The aim of this note is threefold: we first discuss the 
appropriateness of the traditional trust-game-tree for the analysis of trust relationships. 
Following the above definition put forward by Lee et al. (2005), we relate his criteria to the 
subjective probabilities given by Coleman’s inequality. In a second step, we develop the 
“trust-tree-game” further to a psychological trust game in the vein of Dufwenberg (2002). 
Here, we complement the concept of “trust responsiveness” with the idea of “rewarding 
reciprocity” which enables us to consider the issue of mutuality in trust relationships. Finally, 
we move on to the concept of mutual trust (which is more than mutuality in a trust 
relationship), where each individual can be both trustor and trustee. This aspect is visualized 
within the two-persons optimal intertemporal consumption choice model. In this model, the 
rationality of both extending and receiving a credit is founded and can be related to 
Coleman’s credit slip. The corresponding “creditor-debtor-game” reproduces the well known 
“prisoner’s dilemma”. The fact that we though observe multiple creditor-debtor-relationships 
in an economy seems to reflect not only the gains from cooperation in repeated games, but 
also the existence of “generalized” trust in the society.       
 
II.  Mutuality in trust relationships  
 
The original trust tree, trust responsiveness and Coleman’s inequality 
 
If the structure of the game used to exemplify trust does not put forward the vulnerability of 
the trustor, then it is inappropriate to model trust. Also, as Dasgupta puts it, the trustor’s 
“action must be chosen before he or she can observe the actions of the others” (2000, p. 330). 
The following trust-game-tree seems to be “prima facie” a viable approximation to the 
relevant situation; we have two agents A and B who want to exchange goods (B) for money 
(A). If A makes himself vulnerable by delivering the money first (CA), B has either the option 
to submit the goods (CB) or to defect (DB). In the first case, the respective utilities amount to 
say 1 and 1. When B defects, (DB), he stays with the money of A without giving away the 
goods. Now the corresponding utilities are a (< 0) and b (> 1). As the second option seems to 
be the more attractive one and can be anticipated by A (DA), the outcome in this “traditional 
trust game” leads to the “no transaction case” with the respective utilities being (0, 0).   
 
Following Lee (see above), Figure 1, however, can by no means be understood as a 
representation of a „trust(ing) situation“; because there is neither a room for confident 
expectations nor is agent A making himself truly vulnerable. Confidence has to do with 
„calculation“, but also with emotions, morality and reputation (Lahno 2005, p. 95). The above 
traditional trust game suffers from a false reasoning: those aspects which seem to be 
constitutive for a trusting behaviour are simply faded out, namely the emotional, 
normative/ethical and reputational aspects and their corresponding utilities and costs. 
Subsequently, it is argued that rational agents do not have any incentives to trust each other. 










Source: Lahno 2005; author 
 
From first glance, in Figure 1, Agent A is not really making himself vulnerable. As the unique 
(Kreps 1990, p. 101)
2 sub game perfect equilibrium outcome of the game is necessarily (0, 0) 
– „do no transaction“is a (non-cooperative) equilibrium strategy and agent A is always „safe“ 
if he follows it. However, there could be room for confident expectations in Figure 1; even 
when these can obviously not be based on experience with the particular player B, they could, 
in principle, be based on experience with other players in similar situations. This sort of 
“general confidence” would then depend on the expectations people have about the subjects in 
a reference group, and in this sense would concern the reference group's reputation. 
Alternatively, one could argue with the existence of a behavioural norm of reciprocity, whose 
evolutionary stability has been shown by Güth and Kliemt (1994). But, as Bolle puts it, “a 
necessary condition of this result is, however, a large enough probability of detecting 
“exploiters” … (2001, p. 5). In light of this probability, different possible degrees of 
vulnerability come into play.    
 
Something else could happen: Agent B may anticipate what is anticipated by Agent A (see 
above) and foresees that the outcome (0, 0) will be worse for him than transacting without 
defection (0 < 1). He may then want to signal to Agent A that he is inclined not to defect. If A 
anticipates what B anticipates about his own earlier anticipation, then this signal may be 
credible. But this mechanism goes far beyond the “manual description” of the simple one-shot 
trust game. Moreover, sending signals does not make everything easier: “while it is true that if 
a signal is sufficiently expensive and unfakeable cue, it entails that the sender possesses a 
                                                 
2 "But it is the unique equilibrium outcome in this game, played once and played non-cooperatively (that is, if we 
assume that individuals are motivated only by the monetary payoffs involved - part of our qualification “absent 
other considerations" - and if we assume that they have no opportunity to sign a binding and enforceable contract 



































particular quality, it is not true that the absence of a signal entails non-possession of the 
quality.” (Braham/Bolle 2006, p. 230 and Bolle/Kaehler 2007).  
 
In a one-shot game, confidence can be (better) taken into account, when it is feasible to assign 
(subjective) likelihoods/probabilities to possible outcomes of the game. Consider the 
following, modified trust game in Figure 2, in which player A assigns probabilities (p,(1 p) − ) 
to the expected behaviour of player B. 
 
The discussion of the trust phenomenon has been enriched to a considerable extent by the 
introduction of  “trust responsiveness”; the latter stands for a “player’s aversion to letting 
others down” (Gueth/Dufwenberg 2004, p. 2) or likewise for a “tendency to fulfil trust 
because you believe that it has been placed on you” (Guerra/Zizzo 2004, p. 25) and it is said 
that this attitude “depends on the sympathy or respect the trustee feels for the trustor” 
(Bacharach/Guerra/Zizzo 2001, p. 6). The concept of „trust responsiveness“ has made a first 
significant step towards the consideration of emotional und normative/ethical aspects when 
modelling trusting behaviour. So far, however, there seems to be missing the „opposite side“, 
to say so, of „trust responsiveness“. This opposite side should be an attitude of „rewarding 
reciprocity“. Let us see why.  
 






Not only the trustee, but also the trustor can feel emotions: given that he had to invest (so 
much) confidence to compensate his felt and at the same time very much objective 
vulnerability, he will be grateful to the trustee if the latter fulfils the expectations of 
reciprocity. A honours the fact that B has not disappointed trust put in him. When B in fact 
delivers the goods, he may be honoured by an attitude of “rewarding reciprocity” from agent 









































What implications does “rewarding reciprocity” have on the pay offs of the game tree?  While 
„trust responsiveness“ tends to lower b (B’s pay off in the non-cooperative case  (DB) to 
values above, but close to 1, „rewarding reciprocity“ tends to raise B’s pay off in the 
cooperative case  (CB) to (again) values above, but close to 1, too. Notice that B’s pay off 
cannot become lower than 1, because then cooperation would be his dominant strategy and A 
could always pay in advance for the goods without the need to trust B. This is an obvious 
error in Lahno (2005, p. 97). If “rewarding reciprocity” (rr) comes along as an immaterial 
device, A’s pay off will not be affected. If it comes along as a material premium, it will lower 
A’s pay off to values below 1 in the cooperative solution.  
 
The probability p is a proxy for A’s confidence in B, more precisely the belief that  
 
(1) 





   
 
A’s confidence is justified whenever expected income from a transaction exceeds the no 
activity alternative with a pay-off of zero: 
 
(2)  E(A) p (1 p) a 0 =+− ⋅≥, where (1 p) − is a proxy for A’s vulnerability (in likelihood 
equivalents). Considering rr,  
 























Equation (3) or (3a), respectively, is also known in the literature as “Coleman’s inequality”, 
where the denominator of
a
(a 1) −
, (a 1) −  is a proxy for A’s vulnerability (in money 
equivalents), as the sum of foregone benefits and actual payments. It is obvious that an 
increasing vulnerability makes a higher confidence necessary, if the trustor wants to justify 
entering a transaction with the trustee (notice that (a 1) − has a negative sign; therefore, we 





























(5)  V( 1 p ) ( a1 ) =− −            or 
 
(5a) V (1 p)(a rr 1) =− +− 
 
 
“Trust responsiveness” and “rewarding reciprocity” in the (broadened) “psychological 
trust game” (Dufwenberg)   
 
In a second step, we may now develop the above “trust game tree” further to a “psychological 
trust game” in the vein of Dufwenberg’s “marital investment game” (2002, pp. 57-69): As 
there is always the possibility to be cheated by the trustee B, we may assign probabilities to 
the principal choices of the trustor A (transact; don’t transact):  
 
[ ] 0,1 : σ∈ The probability that the trustor A agrees to transact with trustee B 
 
Both the trustor and the trustee prefer the strategy profile (transact, cooperate) to any profile 
where the trustor says I don’t transact.   
 
[ ] 0,1 : τ∈ The probability that the trustee B will cooperate with the trustor A 
 
In order to bring “trust responsiveness” and “rewarding reciprocity” into the game, the 
following beliefs will be denoted: 
 
[ ] '0 , 1 : τ∈ The trustor’s (A’s) expectation of τ (his trust in B) 
[ ] '' 0,1 : τ∈ The trustee’s (B’s) expectation of  ' τ  (his degree of trust responsiveness) 
[ ] ''' 0,1 : τ∈ The trustor’s (A’s) expectation of  '' τ  (his ex-ante degree of willingness to honour 
reciprocity ex-post) 
 
When B makes his choice, “the stronger he expects that (the trustor, the author) trusts him … 
the more disutility of guilt he experiences by choosing” (Dufwenberg 2002, p. 62) to defect. 
When A makes his choice, he will take into account or evaluate, how much he is in principle 
prepared to offer as a reward for reciprocity to agent B. Here, in this psychological context, 
we take it as an immaterial reward to B which accrues not to his attitude of cooperation itself, 
but to the motives of B, not to let down A (or, likewise, to enjoy the fact that someone puts 
trust into him).  Assume that the guilt effect enters additively into the trustee’s utility function 
and that the trustee’s guilt sensitivity is constant at  0 γ≥  (ibid., p. 63). Furthermore, for 
reasons of simplicity, assume that  0 γ≥  can also serve as a proxy for the trustor’s sensitivity 
with regard to the trustee’s degree of reciprocity. Then, rearranging (1), the condition for 
cooperation now reads:  
 
(6) 
* b (b '') (1 ''')
or
b 1 ( '' ''')
or
b ( '' ''') 1
= −γτ < + γτ
<+ γ τ + τ






Now, we can solve the game in the vein of Dufwenberg for different values ofγ. There are 
three different cases:  
 
(1) Let us assume for a moment b to be 4 in order to get things better tractable; if we 
reformulate (6) to the inverse condition (for non-cooperation) and assume in the first place 
1.5 γ< , we get the inequality 4 ( '' ''') 1 −γ τ +τ > , which must hold since  [ ] '', ''' 0,1 ττ∈ . Hence, 
in this case, the trustee will always choose to defect irrespective of his and the trustor’s 
beliefs. Hence, here we have a – by the way sub game perfect – „no trust equilibrium“. This 
equilibrium of course entails the implication: 
 
 
(7)  '' '' ' ' 0 τ=τ =τ =τ =  
 
 
(2) What happens for larger values of  γ (1 . 5 γ≥ )? Consider the case where 3 γ= ; now, we 
get the inequality4 3( '' ''') 1 −τ + τ> . It holds, as long as '' ''' 0.5 τ =τ < , but it does not hold for 
'' ''' 0.5 τ= τ≥ . So there is an obvious range of values when  [ ] 1.5, 3 γ∈ for which multiple 
equilibria exist. Which one is relevant, depends on the beliefs of the involved parties.  
 
(3) In all of these cases, where 3 γ> , there only trusting equilibria are viable. The reason for 
that is that if the trustor is”called upon to move” (ibid., p. 65), he must believe 
that '' '' ' ' 0 . 5 τ= τ= τ ≥ . If, in turn, we introduce this condition into the 
inequality4 ( '' ''') 1 −γ τ +τ > , we arrive at:  
 
 
(8)  4( 0 . 5 0 . 5 ) 1 3 −γ + > →γ>  
 
 
All of these equilibria of course entail the implication: 
 
 
(9)  '' '' ' ' 1 τ=τ =τ =τ =  
 
 
Consider finally the cases of  4 γ=  and of  5 γ=  from A’s viewpoint. Suppose the trustor 
decides to transact; then he will maximise his expected pay-off only, if he expects to get at 
least a pay-off of 0 (see Figure 3). This means that his expectation ofτ, or equivalently, that 






















Sources: Dufwenberg 2002; author 
 
Condition (10) replicates Coleman’s inequality (3) from above. With rational agents – “beliefs 




' '' '''; '' ''' 2 '
1a
−




For this case, we now get the inequality4 4( 2a /(1 a)) 1 − −− > . This inequality is fulfilled 
fora3 / 5 >− . In the case of 5 γ= , the condition changes toa3 / 7 >− . 
 
The above explanation for a likely cooperation between A and B based on a trusting decision 
still has (at least) three shortcomings. First: we still are “captured” by the static categorisation 
of one person being the trustor, the other person being the trustee. Again, daily business and 
private life transactions show us that trust is seldom a one-directional relationship with one 
“active” and one “passive” economic agent. In many, perhaps most of the cases, cooperation 
can only be organized on the basis of mutual trust. Notice that mutual trust is much more than 
mutuality in a trust relationship. Second: So far, we have been dealing only with one-shot 
games. Suppose A decided to trust B in Figure 2 and B honoured A’s trust. Then, it is much 
more likely that in future rounds “each side will cooperate as long as the other does and 
threatens, say never to again cooperate if the opponent takes advantage”, as Kreps (1990, p. 
107) puts it. B will build up a reputation of being trustworthy. B honours A’s trust “because to 
abuse it would preclude or substantially limit (his, the author) opportunities to engage in 
future valuable transactions” (ibid., p. 116). This is something we can observe in day-to-day 
business and private transactions. However, “this story about reputations depends critically on 
there being no last round” (ibid., p. 108). Moreover, contrary to what some studies in the field 
of trust tend to claim – trust leads to cooperation, but the reverse does not hold always. If we 
think of cartels, we would agree that these could not function without a minimum level of 











































economists) would assert that we will always find trust relationships among the members of a 
cartel. Quite the opposite, I suppose, will be normally the case.
3 And third: whether trust can 
be relevant for new transactions between individuals in a society has also to do with what has 
been termed “generalized trust”. In how much is a society on average or in general prepared 
to give room to trusting relationships? Do we find a general atmosphere which is suitable to 
trust, or is that sometimes a mood of suspicion and envy hinders the innovative entrepreneurs 
to engage in promising new endeavours?       
 
 
The intertemporal consumption choice model and Coleman’s credit slip  
 
The assumption to merely identify one trustor and one trustee in economic transactions is far 
too simple. Trust relationships are exchange relationships: either trust is exchanged against 
trust responsiveness/specific emotions (see above) or the exchange is directly related to 
goods/services and financial claims. The idea of exchange does not suffer any depreciation if 
one considers trusting activities to be some sort of advance on the future delivery of 
money/goods, hence as a provision of a credit, very much in the vein of Coleman’s credit slip 
from above.  
 
An appropriate setting to demonstrate the effects of a credit in a two-person environment is 
the well-known intertemporal consumption choice model. There are two households, each of 
them can choose between alternative bundles of homogenous consumption goods available in 
the present or in the future period. In the beginning, each household is provided with an initial 
endowment of future and present consumption goods. However, a household may depart from 
his initial endowment point by entering into an exchange with the other household. This is 
likely, for example, when one of the households has a high time preference and wants to 
exchange some of his future consumption goods against present consumption goods. This, in 
turn, is only viable, if he signs an obligation/a credit contract in which he promises to pay 
back the equivalent of the present consumption goods in the future to the other household. For 












=+ ⎢ ⎥ +ρ ⎣ ⎦
 
 
where 1/1+ρ equals the discount factor applied to future consumption and ρ is the symbol 
for the time preference. In our example, we assume household 1 to have a high time 
preference; he is willing to borrow present consumption goods from household 2 at a 
maximum interest rate of 10 percent. In other words: household 1 is willing to exchange (for 
example) 100 present consumption (to borrow) goods against 110 future consumption goods 









MRS (1 r) 1,10.
dC 100
== − = − + = −  
 
For the second household we assume: 
                                                 
3 A cartel can be best approximated by a collective monopoly, its members debating with jealousy the 
distribution of the quota. It is characterized by the anxiety about the possible outsider competition, as each 












MRS (1 r) 1,05.
dC 100
== − = − + = −  
 
Household 2, hence, is willing to give up 100 units of present consumption goods in exchange 
for 105 units of future consumption goods. His implicit interest rate thus amounts to a 
minimum of 5 percent. How can both households get so seal a deal? This is obviously the 
case, whenever household two receives an implicit interest rate of or higher than 5 percent, 
and if, opposed to this, household 1 would pay an implicit interest rate of or lower than 10 
percent. In this neoclassical equilibrium, an exchange of goods and hence an implicit credit 
contract will be agreed on by the two households at an unique real rate of interest (which, by 
the way, must equal the marginal productivity of capital) and at identical marginal rates of 
substitution between future and present consumption goods for the two households.  
 
In Figure 4 below, we find the graphical solution to the problem well known from text books: 
Y stands for the arbitrarily chosen “endowment point” in the beginning. The corresponding 
intertemporal indifference curves build the famous “lens” known from any other Edgeworth 
box. At Y, the marginal rates of substitution (MRS) differ between the households. This is 
visualized in the figure by the different angles (tanα>tanβ) which the tangents have at the 
respective indifference curves. A possible equilibrium which enables an exchange of goods is 
at Z; here, the interest rate factor (1+r) and the marginal rates of substitution of the two 
households do harmonize (tanγ). Compared to point Y, household 1 and household 2 achieve 
higher levels of utility. Household 1 (2) realizes a higher (lower) consumption in the present 
in exchange for a lower (higher) consumption in the future period. A possible numerical case 






C, C C, C
11 UU
dC dC 107
=MRS MRS (1 r) 1,07
dC dC 100
= = =− =− + =−  
 
Hence, the creditor and the debtor household sign a credit contract with a (real) interest rate of 
7 percent, which is less than what initially household 1 was prepared to pay for, but more than 
household 2 was inclined to ask for. As we will make clear in the following, the optimal 
solution cannot be achieved without trust between the parties. And, as the optimal solution is 
superior for both households in comparison to the initial situation, trust is beneficial to both 
transactors. Moreover, trust has to be mutual and cannot be reduced to a one sided trustor-
trustee-relationship as in the traditional trust game. Also, as the next section will demonstrate, 
our rational choice model can easily be “translated” into a simple simultaneous game 









Mutual trust in the creditor-debtor game 
 
Mutual trust is in place when in principle both players can be trustor and trustee, hence when 
each  player can be characterized by both confident expectations and a willingness to be 
vulnerable (see above). The probability for that economic exchange transactions occur in a 
single,  totally simultaneous move is close to zero, no matter if we are dealing on an East-
Asian bazaar or in an internet auction like EBay. Following the “principle of insufficient 
reason” (Sinn 1980), in 50 percent of the cases, household 1 will have a first mover 
disadvantage, in 50 percent of the cases household 2 will have a first mover disadvantage. 
This implies that, not knowing whether I will be actually the trustor or the trustee, I will be 
better prepared to be the trustor.  
 
The following Figure 5 goes beyond the insights won in Figure 4; as is well known from 
traditional Edgeworth box analysis, Z is not the only possible exchange outcome between the 
two agents. If “market power” is not divided equally between the two involved parties, agent 
1 (agent 2) may enforce an exploitation solution as depicted in point X (U). Inactivity (Y), 
however, is already an inferior solution, as agent 1 (agent 2) – at given utility level of agent 2 
(agent 1) – cannot gain higher utility levels as opposed to the exploitation alternative. The 
latter solution, in turn, will not give rise to distrust in the economy, but rather to 
disappointment or to “innovation” in the sense of a motivation for searching ways to 
disentangle/destroy the obvious market power on the other side. Notice that the basic rules of 
goods exchange in a market economy are not at stake here, there is not yet a reason for that 
“general trust” might fade away. This is different, however, when we come to comment 
points such as V or W. In the first case (V), agent 1 would appropriate 100 units of present 
consumption goods for himself without handing out the obligation/security to agent 2 which, 













































in the next period. In the second case (W), agent 2 would appropriate the mentioned security 
without delivering in exchange the promised amount of present consumption goods.       
 
Realizations such as the points V or W not only represent the actions of perpetrator and victim 
in a (personal) fraud scenario, they should also shake the overall trust in market exchange 
transactions and, in so far, put into danger what has been called above “general trust”. The 
utility levels achieved by either agent 2 in the case of V or agent 1 in case of W  are far below 
those utility levels achievable by inactivity (Y) and, also, below those “produced” by 
expropriation (U, X). Hence, they give incentives to abstain from exchange transactions in the 
future and prevent agents from repeating successful bilateral exchange. The opportunity costs 
of V and W do not consist only of the utility levels associated with Z, but of the option to 
repeat V and W. Repeated cooperative behaviour can best be modelled by modern game 
theory. Therefore, in the following pay-off table, we have “translated”, so to say, the main 






In the subsequent one-shot game, there are, as before, two players (one and two); their 
possible strategies are either to deliver (d) goods/services vs. a signed obligation/ contract or 
to keep back (k). The pay-off structure is a bit more complicated by the fact that there are two 
periods involved. In the northwest cell (kk), both players decide for inactivity; in the northeast 
cell (kd), player 2 delivers his goods/services in advance, while player 1 receives the goods, 
but keeps back the obligation and defects. In the southwest cell (dk), player 1 signs an 
obligation, but is not rewarded by player 2 who keeps back his goods and defects. Finally, in 
the southeast cell (dd), we find the cooperative case, where both players deliver. It is obvious 
that the social surplus has a maximum here. However, it is the combination (kk) which 
represents the Nash equilibrium of the game. The strategy of keeping back is strictly dominant 
for each of the players, just like in the classical “prisoner’s dilemma”:  Even when player 1 















































knew for sure that the other player will defect (keep back), keeping back (defecting) is his 
best answer anyway.  
   
 
Table 1: Pay off matrix in the creditor-debtor game 
 











keep back (k) 
 
 
























*   Player 1 signs an obligation  
** Player 2 delivers goods/services in advance 
V:  Defection by player 1 




“Deep” economic determinants of a likely cooperation/default 
 
Traditional Edgeworth box analysis is capable to provide additional insights into the trust 
puzzle: What economic forces determine the location of the default points V and W, and hence 
the size of pay-off b in the trust game tree of Figure 1 (see above)? As we will show in the 
following, their exact positioning, among other things, is a function of the curvature /degree 
of convexity of the agents’ indifference curves. The latter, in turn, depends on a 
„deep“economic parameter of the “new” economic growth theory labeled the „intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution (σ) “.
4 As we know from several models, but also from empirical 
research, the per capita growth rate of an economy is the higher, the higher σis. A number of 
empirical studies also reveal that the amount of “general trust” available in a society tends to 
contribute positively to economic growth (see, for example Zack and Knack 2001). These 
papers, however, add proxies of “general trust” and/or of “social capital” as factors of 
production rather ad hoc to quite common macroeconomic production functions. The 
microeconomic foundation of their reasoning would be fostered considerably if we could 
demonstrate that a higher „intertemporal elasticity of substitution” goes along - at a given set 
of norms and /or experiences with reciprocity in a society - with a higher likelihood for 
cooperation/a lower likelihood for default/defection in the traditional trust game.  
                                                 
4  () () 10 1 0
10 1 0
d C C d dC dC







The following Figure 6 shows how a representative household distributes his earnings 
between bundles of consumption goods available in the present and in the future at given 
income streams and a given real rate of interest. The elasticity of substitution σ denotes how 
the distribution between the two bundles of goods is changed (from A to B) relatively or in 
percentages, when the real rate of interest is reduced from r
A to r
B . Households will change 
the proportion of their present consumption to their future consumption the less, the stronger 
the convexity of their indifference curves: The move from A’ to B’ is obviously much less 
pronounced than the move from A to B. The elasticity of substitution σ, in turn, is the lower, 



























Remember that σ is the inverse of η, the so-called elasticity of the marginal utility of (present) 
consumption. Impatient agents will usually be characterized by a low σ or a high η; they will, 
and here we come to grips, be more inclined to sign contracts which imply the delivery of 
future consumption goods at unfavorable terms in order to fulfill their desire for a high level 
of present consumption then agents with a higher σ and a lower η, ceteris paribus.   
 
With the help of Figure 7, we can now discuss the implications of a higher σ and a lower η on 
the likelihood for cooperation or default. Assume that we assign, corresponding to the 
traditional trust game, the role of the trustor to agent 1 who is willing to sign a contract – 
which in exchange for the delivery of 90 units of present consumption goods promises the 
delivery of say 112 units of future consumption goods – and the role of the trustee to agent 2 
who promises to deliver 90 units of present consumption goods today after having received 
the contract signed by agent 1. Agent 2 has the choice between fulfilling his obligations or to 
defect. As the obligation signed by agent 1 is an enforceable contract, it is pretty much like 
“money” in the traditional trust game. If agent 2 defaults (W), he appropriates the mentioned 
security worth 112 units of future consumption goods. That is obviously more than in the 
reference case (107). 112 (107) units of future consumption goods correspond to the pay-off 










The conclusion, then, is straightforward: our results, transferred into the traditional trust game 
tree, imply that the gains of default (b) are apparently higher (112 vs. 107), when the trustor is 
characterized by a lower σ and, hence a higher η in comparison to the reference case of Figure 
5. Or, in other words, the “premium” for default is a (negative) function of the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution among the trustor. Hence, cooperation is the more likely, the higher 
the intertemporal elasticity of the trustor involved. The reader may convince himself that this 
result is robust, i. e. that is it does not hang upon the assignments made above. So, if agent 2 
becomes trustor (then, we would have to depict his alternative indifference curves) and agent 
1 becomes trustee, the same outcome will apply.      
 
 
Trust (worthiness) in international lending 
 
The most suitable model for the analysis of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and its 
role in international lending is the two-period small open economy setting offered by Frankel 
and Razin (1996, pp. 155-188). In particular, we have to deal here with the case of 
“investment opportunities, which tilt the time profile of income, augment the levels of 











































Figure 8 illustrates a borrowing country’s investment policy. In the absence of investment, the 
output sequence is  1 Y  and 2 Y . The schedule originating from point Y and passing through 
point  P specifies the transformation schedule linking current period production that is 
allocated for consumption with future period production which is allocated for consumption. 
Diagrammatically, investment spending is measured in a leftward direction from Y. The profit 
maximizing debtor country will seek to reach the highest locus (P) on the investment return 
curve, given the intertemporal price and budget line with slope - (1+r). The maximized level 
of utility obtains at point C at the tangency of indifference curve  12 UU ( C , C ) = with the 
budget line. The country in concern incurs a balance of trade deficit of size EHwhich leads to 
a necessary payment to the creditor country in the subsequent period in the amount of PD 
(including the debt service). Investment equals the distanceEY; domestic savings contribute 
to investment according to the distanceHY. As depicted in Figure 8, the country in concern is 
characterized by a normal or even high intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It will serve as 
our “reference case”.   
 
Suppose now that the country is confronted with a lower rate of interest and a corresponding 
slope of - (1+r’).  How will the profit and utility maxima be affected? As Figure 8 
demonstrates, at a lower interest rate, the country in concern will invest more (I' E'Y = ), 
incur a higher debt (or likewise a higher deficit in the balance of trade (B' E'Y = ), the 
production point will shift leftwards to P’, domestic consumption will rise and the 




shrink to a zero level (YC '0 −= ). Consumers reach a higher utility level at U’. So far, all of 








Now we consider the case where the country in concern is characterized by a lower 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution - and hence much more bended indifference curves - in 
comparison to the case of reference in Figure 8. What changes, what is different?  Let’s put 
the reasoning (see Figure 9) as follows: increasing the interest rate from r’ to r, which makes 
the budget line steeper (- (1+r’) < - (1+r)), will now result in the same (lower) amount of 
investment and production as depicted in Figure 8 at the interest rate r. But now (see Figure 
9), domestic consumption and the deficit in the balance of trade (B) will be higher and 
domestic savings (S) will be lower in comparison to the case of reference (at the interest rate 
r). This implies that such a country deserves less trustworthiness in the eyes of possible 
creditors: Default on a credit contract seems to be the more likely; the less (the more) capital 
inflows are directed into domestic investment opportunities (domestic consumption).  This is 
so, because a debtor country has to produce (consume) comparatively many (few) tradeable 
goods in order to guarantee the debt service towards the creditor country. This problem was at 






Cooperation, mutual trust and generalized trust 
 
Notice that the implication of the Nash solution in Table 1 would be (or better: is) that 
“inactivity” is an equilibrium in an exchange economy. In repeated games, there is a way out 
offered by the tit-for-tat-strategy which makes cooperation profitable also in the case of finite 
games, when the number of rounds is uncertain and/or when agents act with “bounded 
rationality” (Pindyck/Rubinfeld 2003, p. 667). The iteration of cooperative action in a 
simultaneous game is more likely, the greater the uncertainty about the number of possible 
“rounds” is. If the number is finite and known by the players, defection has a greater 
likelihood. The problem with the tit-for-tat logic is that it explains why and when cooperation 
is profitable, but not that cooperation is chosen on the grounds of (mutual) trust. But mutual 
trust can itself become a prerequisite to overcome situations resembled by the prisoner’s 
dilemma. Also, cooperative interactions in the past make a tit-for-tat strategy more likely 
(Haug 1997, p. 18) in the present. But it does not necessarily imply that past cooperation was 
based on a trust relationship. The key point is here perhaps that we have to understand how 
and why agents learn to trust in indefinitely repeated (Engle-Warnick/Slonim 2006) or, 
likewise in finite games with an unknown number of rounds and not how and why agents 
build up a reputation for being cooperative. This is so, because the latter may be, but must not 
be accompanied by trust as the above example of cartels nicely demonstrates. As opposed to 
Lorenz’ view (1999, p. 305), members of a cartel do in fact cooperate, but without the need to 
“share the degree of trust necessary to cooperate”. What makes the members of a cartel 
cooperate is the strong will to maintain prices (and so profits) high and the supply of goods 
low. This is in many cases a “mutually beneficial cooperation” (Gueth/Ockenfels/Wendel 
1997, p. 15), but it is not based on mutual trust. Of course, Lorenz is right to find that “the 
build-up of trust (increases, the author)  ... the likelihood of successful cooperation.” (ibid., p. 
314). However, as the notion of cooperation does not make sense in a unilateral sense and 
trust may be (but must not be) in some cases the reason for cooperation, the trust which is at 
stake here is necessarily a mutual trust. Or, as Lorenz puts it: “trust is (between cooperating 
partners, the author) earned and is reciprocally and mutually merited” (ibid., p. 309).  
 
Can mutual trust on the personal level be supported by the existence of “generalized trust” in 
the society? Following the study of Pérez García et al. (2006) generalized trust or trust 
measured on a national level such as by the World Value Surveys (WVS) can also be proxied 
by the “amplitude of the credit the economy grants in relation to the volume of transactions 
within it” (ibid., p. 25), if we consider that situations in which agents deposit funds in the 
banking sector and trust “their investments to the banks, or in which other individuals receive 
credits” cannot occur without agents being somehow “connected by relationships of trust” 
(ibid.). When it comes to the issue of possible new transactions between individuals in a 
society, the existence of a phenomenon which has been termed “generalized trust” will be 
most important. In how much is a society on average or in general prepared to give room to 
trusting relationships? Do we find a general atmosphere which is suitable to trust, or is that a 
mood of suspicion and envy hinders the innovative entrepreneurs to engage in promising new 
endeavours?     
 
Cooperative actions/activities lead to a social surplus. Social surplus can be calculated as the 
net “profit” from cooperative actions, say in the prisoner’s dilemma:  “A possible 
experimental method to measure social capital … is by studies revealing how often people 
cooperate in prisoner’s dilemma games.” (Paldam/Svendsen 2000, p. 349). This statement is 
ambiguous, though. Not only because there may be a confusion of the terms “social surplus” 
and “social capital”. Again: if cooperation is not due to trust, but to other attitudes, measured 




one could try to estimate that unknown share by the information given in the World Value 
Surveys (WVS); the ratio of respondents who think that it is possible to trust the majority of 
people could in principle be the weight applied to the cooperative outcomes of experiments 
(experimental game theory). But, as Glaeser et al. (2000) find, this ratio may be a better proxy 
for “trustworthiness” than for “trust” in a society (ibid., p. 813). They prefer the answers of 
respondents to questions related to their effective “past trusting behaviour” in order to 
estimate the overall propensity to trust in a society (ibid., p. 819). Game theory based 
experiments – unless they are properly designed to capture cooperation based on trust 
(Gueth/Ockenfels/Wendel 1997) – tend to measure directly the “incentive to cooperate” 
(Glaeser et al. 2000, p. 822) and not, or less so, the propensity to trust. This is revealed 
indirectly by regression analysis which (in the end, only) connects “an index of past trusting 
behaviour and the amount sent in gift/trust experiments” (ibid., p. 827). In going further into 
that direction, one would have a means to even more “harmonize” the two major strands of 
research on the trust phenomenon: one rooted in experimental game theory, the other based on 
questionnaires and the subsequent application of statistical/econometric tools often used in 
empirical macroeconomics: “combining experimental and survey methods in order to allow 
heterogeneous participants to reveal rather than state their propensities to provide and sustain 
elements of social capital” (Bellemare/Kröger 2007, p. 200).  
 
III. Conclusions   
 
Trust responsiveness is a key starting point for the understanding of mutual trust. Introducing 
“honouring trust responsiveness” as an additional attitude of the trustor can possibly help to 
explain how mutuality enters into the trust relationship. To establish mutual trust, however, it 
seems that more aspects come into play. One is the uncertainty about one’s own role in the 
exchange transactions of a market economy. Can I be sure to be the trustor (trustee)? The 
second is the likelihood of repeated transactions in the business field, such as in the credit 
sector. And the third is related to the existence of “generalised trust” in the society. The latter 
may give us hints as to the share of observed cooperation in experiments among agents which 
is due to trust. Beyond these rather psychological determinants of trust it seems worthwhile to 
search for essentially economic variables related to trust. The intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution could be an important one.    
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